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The free enterprise system in the Unites States is threatened
by government regulation so detailed and pervasive that it has
begun to displace private management of the nation's business.'
Advocacy of this scale of regulation is predicated on the belief
that giant-corporation capitalism does not meet the needs of or-
dinary persons, and the conclusion that intervention by the state
is the necessary response. 2 Yet to accept the premise is not to
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concede this conclusion; what follows proposes a means of con-
forming the system of private control of the economy more
closely to the American ideal of economic freedom in order to
diminish the need for government control.
What is the American ideal of economic freedom? In a re-
cent World Congress of legal and social philosophers Shlomo
Avineri, discussing tensions between equality and freedom,
called attention to a basic difference between European and
American social and political institutions resulting from differing
attitudes toward state power.3 The French revolution, and other
revolutions patterned on it, did not destroy absolute state power
but captured and used it to guarantee political liberty for the
individual. As a result, when Europeans consider the question of
economic liberty they think of using state power to equalize the
distribution of economic assets. Americans, on the other hand,
distrusted state power and replaced colonial absolutism with
limited government. As a result, Avineri said, economic liberty
for Americans has meant unrestricted opportunity to be an
entrepreneur.
4
This was undoubtedly true of the United States in the past.
Our social and political institutions were the progeny of Western
Europe, but they developed under unique conditions of open-
ness and opportunity. Institutions of entrenched privilege were
never firmly established here. Education was not controlled by
an established church. Great estates were broken up during and
immediately after the Revolutionary War, and rules of land
holding and inheritance which served an hierarchical pattern of
society were abolished by state legislatures. 5 The state intervened
to guarantee fair opportunity to succeed, not to redistribute
wealth.
The American economy, characterized until about 1870 by
3 Proceedings of World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of
Law and Social Philosophy 112-14 (24-29 August 1975) (unpublished typescript on file
with author). Avineri, then Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, The Hebrew Univer-
sity of Jerusalem, is now Director-General of the Foreign Ministry of Israel. Papers
from the Congress are published in IVR-IX EQUALITY AND FREEDOM: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE (C. Wellman ed. 1977), and IVR-X EQUALITY AND FREEDOM: INTERNA-
TIONAL AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE (G. Dorsey ed., 3 vols., 1977).
4 Proceedings of World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of
Law and Social Philosophy, supra note 3, at 112-14. "Liberty" is often used in Europe
instead of "freedom."
5 James DeLancey's land in New York, which discouraged the sale of Tory estates
in parcels of more than 500 acres, was sold to 275 persons. J. F. JAMESON, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 35 (1956).
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the individual entrepreneurship of small artisans and family
farms, by 1900 was dominated by great aggregations of capital
controlled by trusts or corporations. 6 The Sherman Act of 1890
was intended, at least by its author, to respond to "the inequality
of condition, wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a
single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast
combinations to control production and trade and to break down
competition."7 Yet, as Harold Demsetz has pointed out, the
Sherman Act as initially interpreted was "directed not toward de
facto market concentration but toward acts of monopolization
and restraint of trade."' Those acts that restrain trade and, by
their inherent nature or surrounding circumstances, support the
inference that they were done with the intent to benefit from
restricting competition were the Act's principal targets." The acts
might consist of putting together great aggregations of capital in
a holding company and thus controlling production, transporta-
tion, and sales in gasoline or tobacco."' But a great concentration
of power, even if wrongfully achieved by acts done with the
requisite intent, would not be broken up by the courts unless
there was presently an intent to use the power for restrictive pur-
poses." Government action to deconcentrate was not needed, it
was said, because
*... the freedom of the individual right to contract
when not unduly or improperly exercised was the most
efficient means for the prevention of monopoly, since
the operation of the centrifugal and centripetal forces
resulting from the right to freely contract was the
means by which monopoly would be inevitably pre-
vented if no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it
6 Kristol, supra note 2, at 126.
7 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman), quoted in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428-39 n.1 (1945) (Hand, J.).
8 H. DEMSETZ, THE MARKET CONCENTRATION DOCTRINE 2 (1973). Speaking of a
company that had integrated 180 companies controlling 80 to 90 per cent of steel pro-
duction (less than 50 per cent at time of trial), the Supreme Court said, "the law does
not make mere size an offence or the existence of unexerted power an offence. It, we re-
peat, requires overt acts and trusts to its prohibition of them and its power to repress
or punish them. It does not compel competition nor require all that is possible." United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
" Standard Oil Co. %. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-62, 70-77 (1911); United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 175-84 (1911).
1' Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31-49, 70-77 (1911); United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 155-175, 181-184 (1911).
11 United States %'. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 445-457 (1920).
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and no right to make unlawful contracts having a
monopolistic tendency were permitted.'
2
From such small misdirections grow the dysfunctions of a
later day. The problem sought to be dealt with was the "inequal-
ity of condition, of wealth, and opportunity" that had grown out
of "the concentration of capital into vast combinations."' 3 The
means chosen was prohibition of acts that unreasonably re-
stricted competition. From then on the question was not whether
in light of current conditions everyone was as free as possible to
be an entrepreneur, but whether in light of current conditions
competition was as free as possible. The corporate entity was as
much the beneficiary as the target of antitrust enforcement. So
long as conduct, not size, was to trigger the Sherman Act, it
would be inconceivable that concentration was an adversary of
opportunity. Protecting free competition sometimes, perhaps
often, incidentally protected the opportunity to be an entre-
preneur. Nevertheless, the uniquely American concern for indi-
vidual opportunity14 did not speak through the antitrust law.
The language of economic freedom would continue to be used
to refer to an economy increasingly dominated by giant corpo-
rate entities who demanded to be free from all restrictions upon
themselves except those imposed by the market place, but who
had agglomerated into their control hundreds of thousands of
decisions that otherwise would have been made by independent
entrepreneurs.
The focus of the antitrust laws with respect to concentration
has always been on market power, not on entrepreneurial op-
portunity. Congress acted against incipient concentration in the
Clayton Act of 1914 again by banning only discrete practices,
such as exclusive dealing, tying, and corporate acquisitions of
corporate stock or share capital, where the effect "may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 15
The Act makes clear that control of decisionmaking in acquired
corporations is to be limited only for the purpose of protecting
competition. The Clayton Act's declaration that the antimerger
section shall not apply in cases of purchase solely for investment
is followed by this disclaimer:
12 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
SSee note 7 supra & accompanying text.
14 See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
15 Clayton Act §§ 3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1970).
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Nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a
corporation engaged in commerce from causing the
formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual car-
rying on of their immediate lawful business, or the
natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof,
or from owning and holding all or a part of the stock of
such subsidiary corporations, when the effect of such
formation is not to substantially lessen competition. a6
The Clayton Act also prohibits interlocking directors, but only
if the corporations are competitors. 17
If a purpose of the Clayton Act were to protect entre-
preneurial opportunity-as well as to protect competition-it
would contain provisions aimed at limiting concentrations of
decisionmaking, doubtless balanced against countervailing eco-
nomic values. As an example, there might be a provision pro-
hibiting corporate acquisitions of stock or share capital, or the
formation of subsidiary corporations, where the effect may be
to restrict independent decisionmaking more than is reason-
ably necessary to achieve economies of scale.
By 1945 it was no longer credible to assume that the cen-
trifugal and centripetal forces of the market would inevitably
prevent concentrations so long as the government prevented an-
ticompetitive acts. Perhaps as a consequence of this new under-
standing, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America"' and American
Tobacco Co. v. United States 9 redirected the Sherman Act toward
market concentration. In a key paragraph of his opinion in the
Alcoa case, Learned Hand discussed whether monopoly power,
or its misuse, was the evil sought to be prevented by the Sher-
man Act. He first suggested economic considerations for prefer-
ring a free market to concentrations of power, stating, among
other things: "Many people believe that possession of unchal-
lenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and
depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic,
and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of
constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition
to let well enough alone."2 The economic argument against
concentration was directed to protecting competition. Spurred
"16Id. § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18(1970).
17 1d. § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
18 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
2' 148 F.2d at 427 (1945).
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by diligence and thrift, businesses would produce better quality
goods at lower prices. The increase in entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity that would result from deconcentration would be merely
an incidental benefit.
In this same remarkable paragraph, Hand also suggested a
non-economic Congressional motive for the Sherman Act:
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral ef-
fect, to prefer a system of small producers, each depen-
dent for his success upon his own skill and character, to
one in which the great mass of those engaged must
accept the direction of a few. These considerations,
which we have suggested only as possible purposes of
the Act, we think the decisions prove to have been in
fact its purposes.2
Promoting entrepreneurial opportunity is conjoined with a dis-
taste for centralized decisionmaking; these fundamental non-
economic concerns that were lost in the initial missteps in the
interpretation of the Sherman Act reappear in Hand's language
as purposes, not just incidental benefits, of the Act.
Yet these famous passages from Alcoa are hardly conclusive.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act was viewed as comprehending the
fact of concentration. Yet Judge Hand's enigmatic discussion
only speculates22 whether competition as an economic desideratum
or individual opportunity was to be the salutary effect of attack-
ing monopoly. The former would be simple restatement of anti-
trust concern for anticompetitive conduct; the latter might
herald a reanimation of the American ideal of economic
liberty. 23 Whatever Judge Hand's dicta import for the principle
of opportunity, his reserving of efficiency-related defenses
under section 2 indicates that the fact of market concentration
alone-"monopoly in the concrete"-does not warrant govern-
ment-directed deconcentration. Even if concentration is the evil
to be eradicated, the imposition of criminal liability will require
some non-innocent acts of acquisition or use.24 Monopoly power
innocently acquired, as a result of a very narrow market, changes
21 Id.
22 Judge Hand would only say that "[m]any people believe" in the pernicious effects
of monopoly, text accompanying note 20 supra, and that "it is possible" to prefer a
system of small producers, text accompanying note 21 supra.23 See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
24 148 F.2d at 429-30.
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in taste or cost, or "superior skill, foresight and industry"25 pro-
duced the effects of concentration sought to be avoided but did
not violate the Sherman Act. And the acts of acquisition or use
of concentrated market power that were said to violate the Act
were all restrictions of competition.2 6 If no anticompetitive acts
were found in the acquisition and use of concentrated market
power there was no violation of the Act. Alcoa left no reason to
inquire whether more decisions controlling economic resources
were concentrated into a single corporate structure than were
reasonably necessary to gain certain benefits, such as economy of
scale. Exclusion of competition was the sole consideration, not
exclusion of entrepreneurial opportunity. When the Supreme
Court27 the following year in American Tobacco explicitly en-
dorsed the reasoning and result of Alcoa, it quoted Hand's
statement on stimulating competition, but then skipped to the
final sentence of the paragraph, without mentioning the sug-
gested non-economic motive.28 Entrepreneurial opportunity as a
purpose of the Sherman Act emerged belatedly, existed briefly,
but did not survive.
To understand why the American view of economic free-
dom as entrepreneurial opportunity did not survive industri-
alization of the nation requires some exploration of the long
intellectual tradition respecting the interplay of property and
freedom. Traditionally, the institution of property distributes
authority to make decisions about material assets. Commonly,
only persons believed capable of making decisions that will be-
nefit the whole group are permitted to make these key decisions;
and indiscriminate individual ownership of material assets is
permitted only in a society adhering to the belief that all persons
are equally capable of making the decisions that cumulatively
result in the utilization of the material assets upon which the
society depends for survival and prosperity. History yields many
examples of these perceptions of the relation between property
and decisionmaking.
The ancient Greeks believed that the gods controlled all
events, including the outcome of battles and the size of harvests.
They also believed that the original founders of families had
25 Id. at 430.
26 Id. at 430-31.
21 The Alcoa case was certified to the senior panel of the Second Circuit for want of
a quorum on the Supreme Court. Id. at 421; see 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1970).
28 328 U.S. at 813.
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some of the power of gods to control events and that they
passed this active power through the blood to the first legitimate
son. The current possessor of the active power of the founder of
the family, quite reasonably, was believed to be the person best
capable of approaching the gods, to propitiate or appease them,
or to learn their will. Accordingly, the housefather, or pater-
familias, had sole authority to make decisions in battle, domestic
disputes, and economic matters.
29
The Greek natural philosophers questioned the concept of a
world controlled by the whimsy of the gods, and posited a world
of natural cause and effect. According to the Stoics, every ma-
ture person possessed reason and therefore was equally capable
of learning causes and the effects they produced. If the causes of
a good crop were in the fertility and cultivation of the soil, the
quality of the seed, and the presence in due measure of sun and
water-and not in the actions of favorably disposed gods push-
ing plants up through the ground-there was no reason for any
person who wished to farm to be denied authority to make deci-
sions about the utilization of a piece of land. One person's deci-
sions were likely to be as effective as another's. The Romans
adopted the Stoic view of reality, saw its implications for distribu-
tive justice, and created a law of property that permitted indis-
criminate, private land ownership.
30
The relationship between prevailing belief about capacity to
make socially beneficial decisions and the use of property con-
cepts to distribute decisionmaking about material assets is con-
firmed by the modern example of rejection of private ownership
and control of material assets used for production. Marxist
philosophy turns away from the natural law, humanistic belief
that the world is characterized by a fixed, rational order that can
be known by human beings because they are rational by nature,
and adopts the view that order is not fixed, once and for all, but
is constantly coming into being. For Hegel, order emerges from
the process of ideas in the mind of Universal Spirit coming into
objective reality in nature and in history. Marx also adopted a
dynamic view of history but rejected Hegelian dialectical
idealism for dialectical materialism, in which order emerges
29 N. FUSTEL DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY 15-116 (1956).
3,, Dorsey, The Influence of Philosophy on Law and Politics in Western Civilization, in
PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE EAST AND WEST 533-538 (1968); R. SOHM, INSTITUTES OF
ROMAN LAW 177-78, 186-93, 449-50, 482-88, 501-05 (3rd English ed. J. Ledlie trans.
1907).
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from a process of responding to new objective conditions of
production, such as a new technology. Most persons are able to
respond only in accordance with a consciousness bound by nar-
row personal experience, but a few persons, according to
Marxism-Leninism, can understand the full sweep and direction
of the process of dialectical materialism. Only they, it is said, can
understand what the present stage of the process requires in
production relations, in order for social justice to prevail. Only
they, therefore, should be permitted to make decisions about
utilization of the material resources available to the whole society
for its survival and prosperity. This is the justification for
nationalization of the means of production in communist
countries.3
American society has been deeply and pervasively influenced
by Locke.32 He is of the natural law tradition, but with an eccen-
tricity that results in special emphasis on property. The Stoics
and the Roman jurisconsults based the equality of persons on
equal possession of reason; Locke bases it on equal possession of
dominion and sovereignty. The condition of all persons in the
natural state, according to Locke, is one "of perfect freedom to
order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons
as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without
asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
3 3
The law of nature is that ."being all equal and independent, no
one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or pos-
sessions."3' 4 The Lockean individual, being equal to and inde-
pendent of every other individual, is implicitly complete. Civil
society is formed not to enable individuals to realize their full
potentiality, but to enable them better to protect their property.
31 J. HAZARD, THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 13-33, 202-05 (4th ed. 1968); K.
MARX & F. ENGELS, Opposition of the Materialistic and Idealistic Outlook, I SELECTED WORKS
16-80 (1969).
32 We need not have been consciously influenced. Lacking a feudal past to react
against and being so much of one mind about ethics and morality we could skip the
articulation of premises and get on with practical problems. See L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL
TRADITION IN AMERICA 3-23, 35-66, 228-55 (1955). Hartz makes essentially the same
point as Avineri, notes 3-4 supra & accompanying text. Americans did not need to re-
sort to absolute power to free themselves from inferior status in an older, rigidly
stratified society; thus we did "not understand the meaning of sovereign power" and
had no socialist tradition. With whole and innocent hearts we embraced a liberalism of
atomistic individualism and minimal government. L. HARTZ, supra at 5-23.
"aJ. LOCKE, TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 5 (Appleton-Century Phil. Source
Books ed. 1937).34 Id. 6.
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By property Locke means all those things over which the indi-
vidual exercises full dominion in the natural state-life, health,
liberty, and possessions. According to Locke, these are the prop-
erty of persons in the same way that all persons are the property
of God. 5 In the natural state every individual possesses legisla-
tive and executive power over others, but only to the extent
necessary to require others to observe the law of nature.3 6 None
possesses arbitrary power over another; what is not possessed
can not be transferred to civil society, therefore civil society and
its government cannot take property without the consent of the
governed.3 7 Indeed, "government has no other end but the pres-
ervation of property. 38
Locke's pervasive influence on American thought and action
and the primacy of property in Locke's thought go far to explain
the Supreme Court opinions that developed the doctrine of sub-
stantive due process.3 9 Prior to the Civil War the view was gener-
ally held that freedom to make decisions about one's property, in
a broad Lockean sense that includes the labor of one's body, was
beyond the authority of the state to grant or to take away, but a
natural law approach to vested property rights was not clearly
fixed in judicial interpretation of any constitutional clause before
acceptance of the fourteenth amendment.40 In the Slaughter-
House Cases,'4 1 in 1873, the Supreme Court majority rejected
arguments that the privileges and immunities clause or the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment should be inter-
preted to forbid the states from taking away an individual's right
to engage in a particular business. 42 Justice Bradley, in a dissent
joined by Justice Field, said:
Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are
equivalent to rights of life, liberty, and property. These
are the fundamental rights which can only be taken
away by due process of law ....
3 5 d. 6, 90, 82.
3 6 Id. 17.
3 7 Id. 88-94.
38 Id. 62.
39 See note 53 infra & accompanying text.
4" Corwin, Introduction to CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, xxviii-xxxii (1973).
41 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
42 Id. at 80-81.
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For the preservation, exercise, and enjoyment of
these rights the individual citizen, as a necessity, must
be left free to adopt such calling, profession, or trade as
may seem to him most conducive to that end. Without
this right he cannot be a freeman. This right to choose
one's calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is
the object of government to protect; and a calling, when
chosen, is a man's property and right.
[A] law which prohibits a large class of citizens from
adopting a lawful employment, or from following a law-
ful employment previously adopted, does deprive them
of liberty as well as property, without due process of
law.
43
In the ensuing years the Supreme Court moved toward, and in
1897 adopted, the Bradley position, in Allgeer v. Louisiana :
44
The liberty mentioned in [the fourteenth amendment]
means not only the right of the citizen to be free from
the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarcer-
ation, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his facul-
ties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
45
At any time prior to 1870 it would have made sense, but
was unnecessary, 6 to write into the Constitution a prohibition
against government interference with the right of the individual
to freely choose his calling and sell his labor or services. In an
economy of small artisans and family farms, a free market could
reasonably be expected to return to each individual the rough
equivalent of the value of the labor, management, or capital he
contributed. The opportunity to engage in business for oneself
genuinely embodied the promise of the New World, epigram-
matically stated by Benjamin Franklin in Poor Richard's Al-
43 1d. at 116-22.
44 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
45 1d. at 589. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
46 It was assumed that government was inherently so limited and therefore explicit
constitutional limitation was not needed. See Corwin, supra note 40, at xxvii & n.60.
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manac, that anyone could gain a position of respect and sub-
stance through diligence, thrift, and individual initiative.47 In the
United States, positions in the community were open to the
self-made man that in Europe could be gained only through
birth or church preferment. The European literature on the
meanness and greed of the petit bourgeois is alien to the tradi-
tion of Locke and Franklin in the United States. Private property
is the material basis for the self-sufficient, diligent, responsible,
freely contracting individual who deserves the protections of the
Bill of Rights.48
Unfortunately, in 1897 when the Supreme Court wrote
Lockean materialistic individualism into the due process clause
of the Constitution, the economy had changed from natural per-
son capitalism to corporate capitalism. The value of the goods
and services produced by a corporate participant in the market
place is the cumulative result of the total contributions of capital,
management, and labor of all the persons associated in the cor-
porate enterprise. Assuming competition, the corporate enter-
prise will receive a return roughly equal to the total value of the
labor, management, and capital it contributes to the economy,
because the market will determine which competitor's goods are
bought and at what price. In an economy of enterprises by
natural persons, this action of the market serves to return to
each person the rough equivalent of the value contributed. In
the case of corporate enterprises, however, the market returns to
the corporation the rough equivalent of its cumulative contribu-
tion, but does not return to each individual within the corpora-
tion the rough equivalent of his contribution. Intracorporate dis-
tribution is determined by those in control of the corporation,
which by corporation law means those who hold dominant stock
ownership. By pyramiding corporations, each of which holds
dominant stock ownership in corporations at the next lower
level, a very few persons with relatively small original investment
could control the distribution of the return for the value of the
labor, management, and capital contributed by thousands of in-
vestors and workers.4 "
47 B. FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND SELECTIONS FROM
His OTHER WRITINGS 222 (Modern Library ed. 1944).
48 The authenticity of this view of property for the United States was recently af-
firmed in a much cited article, Reich, The New Property, 73 Y~A.E LJ. 733, 771-77
(1964).
49 T. VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 128-76 (Mentor ed. 1963).
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The disparity of incomes at the turn of the century indicates
that those who built corporate empires used their control to
greatly favor themselves. In 1900 Andrew Carnegie, who aggre-
gated 180 companies into United States Steel, had a personal
income of $23 million, at a time when the United States had no
income tax. The average annual wage of all American workers
was $400 to $500, with no social security, no workmen's compen-
sation, and no unemployment insurance.5 Even in the absence
of a corporate empire the bargaining power of a corporate em-
ployer was vastly disproportionate to that of a single worker.
The Supreme Court's "Ben Franklin" interpretation of the due
process clause in "Andrew Carnegie" times was disastrous for
natural persons seeking to cope with the corporate concen-
trations of economic power. Substantive due process blocked for
forty years constitutional approval of some of the means,
through voluntary and representative institutions, for dealing
collectively with economic and social problems that could no
longer be handled by individual efforts. Although this doctrine
assertedly vindicated entrepreneurial rights," l invariably it was
the corporation's viewpoint that prevailed at the expense of the
individual's interest.
2
The constitutional bar to legislation providing for collective
bargaining, maximum hours, minimum wages, improved work-
ing conditions, prohibition of child labor, farm mortgage relief,
employment insurance, workmen's compensation, and social
security was removed in 1937 by the dramatic repudiation of the
substantive due process doctrine.5 3 Some collective means of
50 F. ALLEN, THE BIG CHANGE 24 (1952).
", See text accompanying note 45 supra.
-2 E.g. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage law repug-
nant to due process clause); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (statute forbidding
employment agency from collecting fee from placed workers invalidated as "arbitrary"
ban on "useful business"); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state law prohibiting
"yellow dog" contracts, by which employees agree not to join union as condition of
employment, invalidated as abridgment of employers' and employees' freedom of con-
tract); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state law setting maximum work
hours per week abridges contract rights of employers and employees).
11E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage law re-
pugnant to due process clause), overruled, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937). Writing for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia below in Adkins,
Associate Justice Van Orsdel had declared, "[i]t should be remembered that of the
three fundamental principles which underlie government, and for which government
exists, the protection of life, liberty and property, the chief of these is property."
Children's Hosp. v. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 622 (D.C. Ct. App. 1922), aff'd, 261 U.S. 525
(1923).
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meeting the distortions and abuses of corporate concentrations
of economic power had not been blocked by substantive due
process. The antitrust laws should be included in this category,
and probably the most significant measure was the progressive
income tax. Labor unions and the income tax schedules have
radically narrowed the gap between the income of workers and
corporate executives and directors. The 1974 salary of the chief
executive officer of Exxon (formerly Standard Oil of New Jer-
sey) was $677,000, corporate executives salaries in the oil indus-
try having risen thirty-three per cent from the previous year. 54 No
doubt the impact of high-bracket tax obligations on that salary
was offset by stock options and other forms of deferred compen-
sation. It is surely significant, however, that Anthony Sampson,
the author of a recent book in the tradition of muckraking jour-
nalism on the great oil companies, reports breathlessly that the
directors of Exxon each "earn over $200,000 a year."" The
comparison between the salaries paid by Exxon and Carnegie's
earnings56 exemplifies the narrowing-if still considerable-
gap between the income of corporate empire executives and that
of workers.
5 7
We have examined in some detail the effect of the doctrine
of substantive due process on the efforts of natural persons to
cope with corporate concentrations of economic power. What
was the effect of the Court's embracing Lockean individualism as
a tenet of constitutional law on the corporate entities that were
aggregating the economic power? The Supreme Court equated
them with natural persons, accorded them the benefits of the
equal protection 58 and due process5 "- clauses of the Constitution,
and treated legal persons, whether corporate or natural, as equal
14 A. SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS 372 (1976).
Id. 12.
Carnegie's income was 46,000 times that of the contemporary wage earner,
whereas Exxon's top salary is only 60 times that of the modern wage earner. See text
accompanying notes 50 & 54 supra and note 57 infra.
" The average annual income for all industrial workers in the United States in
1974 was $11,434, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1976 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 378 (1976), up from the $400 to $500 of Carnegie's day. See text ac-
companying note 50 supra.
58 Santa Clara County v. Southern P.R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). Although the Santa
Clara Court assumed without discussion that corporations were entitled to equal protec-
tion, id. at 396, a later case, Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), held the matter
settled, citing Santa Clara. Id. at 522.
59 Minneapolis R.R. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889).
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under the law even if they were decidedly unequal eco-
nomically.
63
Lo, the artificial legal entity of the corporation was born
again. It had become even as a natural person, entitled to exer-
cise dominion and sovereignty over itself and all its possessions
lawfully acquired and lawfully used. To deprive it of the right to
make decisions controlling any part of what it "owns"-except in
punishment for unlawful acts of acquisition or use-would be to
violate the economic scriptures according to Locke. Even in the
mind of so astute a judge as Learned Hand, the artificial corpo-
rate entity was personified, replacing the natural person as the
"competitor," and "[t]he successful competitor, having been
urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins. '" 61
Protecting entrepreneurial opportunity by limiting the assets
that corporations are permitted to control, except incidentally to
the protection of competition, is theoretically impossible, because
otherwise the legal implications of "property" would be denied.
The fictional corporate person is as much an entrepreneur as is
the individual. In weighing the appropriate remedy to be ap-
plied to the Standard Oil Company in 1911 the Supreme Court
said that protection of the public against undue restraint of
competition is the "foundation" upon which the statute rests but
it must not be overlooked "that one of the fundamental purposes
of the statute is to protect, not to destroy, rights of property.
'62
The result of placing the mantle of Lockean individualism
on artificial corporate shoulders is that enormous concentrations
of economic power were permitted within the control of a very
few persons. Reflection perhaps not possible when these events
first occurred should convince one that the correlation proposed
by Locke between property ownership, decisionmaking power,
opportunity and ultimately individuality does not hold in the
case of the large corporation. Indeed, Berle and Means called
our attention over forty years ago to the divergence of owner-
ship and control in the corporation.63 Failure effectively to en-
force the anti-concentration aspects of the antitrust laws may
have contributed to this development. It is disputed whether
market-share concentration has been increasing, with the weight
6
"See cases cited note 52 supra.
61 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
62 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911).
63 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933
& rev. ed. 1968).
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of authority favoring the negative.64 Yet great opportunities
exist for assembling assets into corporate structures without
eliminating competition. In any event, it is indisputable that tre-
mendous amounts of material assets are controlled by small sets
of executives of giant corporations. A comparison of the Stan-
dard Oil Company before the 1911 dissolution with just one of
the thirty-eight companies that resulted from the dissolution
demonstrates that enforcement intended to secure competition
may have negligible effect on either the fact of concentration or
the distorted relationship between property and control.
Beginning in the 1870's John D. Rockefeller and a few as-
sociates began to put together a combination of companies that
would completely control the production, transportation, refin-
ing, and marketing of oil and oil products in the United States
and some foreign countries. 65 The combination was organized in
the form of a trust in 1882, but from 1899 it was organized
under Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) as a holding com-
pany.66 In 1911, the last year of the combination's existence it
had total assets of $860.4 million, 70,000 employees, and earn-
ings of $95 million. 67 The thirteen corporate officers and six-
teen directors of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) had the
authority to make the decisions controlling this economic
power. 68 In fact, because there was some overlap between offi-
cers and directors and some directors were not active, manage-
ment was in the hands of eight persons.
69
As a result of the dissolution following Standard Oil Co. v.
United States,711 Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) became an
operating company, one of the thirty-eight companies into which
the combination was dissolved. Jersey Standard was by far the
11 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 658-65 (1974); Adel-
man, Concentration in Manufacturing. 1901-1947, in MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 78-83 (rev. ed. E. Mansfield 1968): P. MCCRACKEN & T. MOORE, CoM-
PETITION AND MARKET CONCENTRATION IN THE AMERICAN ECOMONY (American Enter-
prise Institute for Public Policy Research, Reprint No. 25, 1973). Contra, M. DIMOCK,
BusINESS AND GOVERNMENT 124-44 (1953); M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, AMERICA, INC.: WHO
OWNS AND OPERATES THE UNITED STATES 34-75 (1971); Mueller, Concentration in Man-
ufacturing, in MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 73-77 (rev. ed. E. Mans-
field, 1968).
65 Hidy & Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business 1882-1911 in 1 HISTORY OF STANDARD
OIL COMPANY (NEW JERSEY) 24-32 (1955).
66 Id. 40-49, 219-32, 305.
6 7 Id. 580, 628-29, 636-37.
6 8 Id. 313-15.
69 1d. 313-23.
76221 U.S. 1, 77-82 (1911).
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largest of the resulting companies, with $285.4 million in as-
sets."1 But among the disaffiliated companies were the Standard
Oil companies of New York, Indiana, Ohio, California, Kansas,
Kentucky and Nebraska, Atlantic Refining, Continental Oil, and
companies controlling pipelines and tanker fleets. 72 Three of the
disaffiliated companies, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard
Oil of New York (Mobil), and Standard Oil of California (Socal)
came to be among the seven largest oil companies in the world.7 3
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) changed its name to
Exxon in 1973. In 1975 Exxon had total assets of $32.8 billion,
137,000 employees, and earnings of $2.4 billion (down from the
1974 high of $3.0 billion), on sales of $47.8 billion. The 25
corporate officers and 16 directors have the authority to make
the decisions controlling this economic power. 4
The Standard Oil experience is but one instance of escalat-
ing organized economic and social power visible throughout the
United States. Capital needed to be concentrated in order to buy
machines, build plants, and pay workers so that the benefits of
industrialization could be realized. Workers had to resort to the
power of private organization and government in order to wrest
from corporate concentrations of economic power a fair share
of the benefits of industrialization. Giant corporations have
achieved tremendous economic power, far beyond what was
necessary to exploit the 'opportunities of industrialization be-
cause corporate legal persons were equated with natural legal
persons and accorded the rights of property which, in the Lock-
ean tradition, are associated with the values of individualism.
In this perspective, the current public debate is seen to be
too narrowly conceived. Two alternatives are assumed: Increase
the regulation of business or free business from stifling regula-
tion. In either case the individual is at the mercy of great con-
centrations of power-governmental in the one case, purpor-
tedly private in the other. There needs to be another alternative
that gives primacy to the interests and needs of the individual.
Ralf Dahrendorf suggests just such an alternative in his
1974 Reith Lectures. He calls it the "new liberty. 75 Presently
71 Gibb & Knowlton, The Resurgent Years, 1911-1927 in 2 HISTORY OF STANDARD OIL
COMPANY (NEW JERSEY) 6 (1955).
7
2 Id. 7-10.
73 A. SAMPSON, supra note 54, at 36-39.
74 1 1976 MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1356-57 (1976).
75 R. DAHRENDORF, THE NEW LIBERTY: SURVIVAL AND JUSTICE IN A CHANGING
WORLD (1975).
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Director of the London School of Economics, formerly a
member of the Commission of the European Communities and a
distinguished Professor of Sociology at Hamburg and Tilbingen
in his native Germany, Dahrendorf speaks from the perspective
of the western European experience. He sees today's powerful
organizations as having arisen to serve the needs of the masses as
they revolted against societies in which only the few had mean-
ingful rights and the many suffered economic peonage and
political disfranchisement. 76 These organizations "helped people
to get where they are today, but they have developed their own
inertia, and imperialism. ' 77 Individual participation is frustrated
and initiative is stifled. The new liberty is the liberty of the indi-
vidual to make the most of his capacities and opportunities as he
sees fit, to be recognized as being possessed of dignity. "Mature
citizens demand direct participation in their affairs; the new lib-
erty requires the combination of this legitimate demand with the
need for stimulating initiative .... -78The new liberty means
maximizing individual life-chances and it must be "gained not
only against the bureaucratic imperialism of government agen-
cies, but as much if not more against the uncontrolled power of
allegedly private organizations, giant companies, for example, or
trade unions. 79
Just as Dahrendorf's "new liberty" departs from the Euro-
pean thesis that liberty inheres in government-directed redis-
tribution, Americans need to reanimate the "old liberty" that
values individual freedom above public or private centralized
power. If this alternative is preferred, we must reject increased
government regulation and at the same time limit the power of
the private.organization of corporate capitalism. A place to begin
would be to repudiate the identification of the corporate legal
person with the natural person that resulted in the cultural ap-
proval and legal protection of individual entrepreneurship being
extended to the smothering agglomerations of giant corpora-
tions. Corporations should have been recognized as useful or-
ganizational forms for concentrating the capital needed for in-
dustrialization, but also they should have been recognized as
enemies of individual freedom. Every restriction on entre-
76 Compare Avineri's view, text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
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preneurial opportunity should have been tolerated only after
ample and explicit justification in terms of a sufficient economic
benefit. Not one ounce of individual opportunity should have
been yielded beyond that which was absolutely necessary to ac-
quire the benefits of industrialization.
Of course this is hindsight. Given the central importance of
the property concept in distributing the making of important
decisions about utilization of the material resources of a society,
and given the special importance of property in Locke's thought,
it would have been impossible at the advent of the Sherman Act
to rally sufficient support to limit the size of corporations in
order to protect entrepreneurial opportunity. Is it possible now?
The use of the property concept to distribute decisionmak-
ing about material assets, in fact, is appropriate only for natural
persons, not for artificial legal persons such as corporations. In
the past, decisionmaking was placed in those who: (1) Could
effectively approach the gods who controlled events, (2) Could
understand cause and effect in a rational world, (3) Could un-
derstand the process of historical materialism, and (4) Could
responsibly control their own activities. 81' It is nonsense to talk
about such characteristics with respect to an artificial legal per-
son. The extent of the concentration of decisionmaking permit-
ted to the corporation should not have been based upon the
presumed capacity of a "person," but upon the economic benefit
of such concentration.
The implication of the inaptness of using property concepts
to distribute decisionmaking to corporations is not just that it
should not have been done in the past, but also that the resulting
giant concentrations of economic power can be undone without
requiring dissolutions in terms of property concepts. The possi-
bility has been before our eyes ever since Berle and Means
pointed out the divergence between corporate ownership and
corporate control.81 This possibility has been utilized by the
Canadians in the Foreign Investment Review Act of 1973.82 This
Act, which establishes procedures and guidelines for review of
foreign investments in Canada and provides for prohibition of
investments not found to be beneficial to the country,83 departs
from the property concept of ownership in defining the entities
80 Text accompanying notes 29-34supra.
, A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 63.
2 Can. Stat. c. 46 (1973).
83 1d. §§ 7, 12.
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subject to its provisions. Instead, it adopts the terms "businesses"
and "business enterprises" to indicate sets of economic activities
with respect to which controlling and directing decisions will be
subject to regulation under the Act.
8 4
One way of deconcentrating economic power in the United
States without massively disrupting the stock market and the
aspects of the economy dependent upon it, is to reinterpret
"person" in the antitrust laws as referring not to corporations
but to "businesses," understood functionally as centers of de-
cisionmaking-decisions that direct and control a significant
amount of economic activity. The sets of decisions that would
constitute an independent "business" subject to the antitrust laws
should be determined by balancing the value of providing max-
imum feasible entrepreneurial opportunity against the value of
securing economic benefits such as economy of scale.85 The fac-
tors to be included in the standards to be applied in this process
will emerge with experience-as they have, for instance, with
respect to the process of determining whether certain acts may
have a substantial adverse effect on competition. Whether the
economic activities are similar or dissimilar, and whether they are
carried on at one location or many locations, would seem to be
significant. Functionally, economists have always considered the
plant to be the natural economic unit.
It might be necessary to have a preliminary step in antitrust
cases to determine which units within a corporate structure are
functionally independent and therefore subject to the antitrust
laws, somewhat like the determination of the relevant market.
Corporations would not be required to divest themselves of units
84 Id. § 3(1).
85 The premise that common ownership and control will not exempt intracorporate
dealings from the antitrust laws has been recognized by the Supreme Court in one,
albeit narrow, sense. Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598
(1951) ("common ownership or control of the contracting parties does not liberate them
from the impact of the antitrust laws"); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218,
227 (1947) (section 1 of the Sherman Act may be violated by "a conspiracy among those
who are affiliated or integrated under common ownership"). The reach of these cases is
questionable, and in no event do they extend beyond condemnation of intraenterprise
conspiracy that restrains third party competitive activity. ATrORNEY GFNERAi2S NA-
TIONAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPORT 34 (1955). The suggestion
made in this article goes far beyond the Supreme Court's declaration of antitrust re-
sponsibility for certain intracorporate decisionmaking and would look to restraints
within a large corporation, as well as those aimed at third parties. The recognized unit
of antitrust responsibility in this proposal would be determined by functional economic
considerations and not by reference to the legal distinction between parent and sub-
sidiary relied upon by the Supreme Court.
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declared to be independent businesses for the purposes of the
antitrust laws, but the controlling decisions with respect to that
set of economic activities would have to be truly independent
-that is, made in the interest of that unit, and from the stand-
point of that unit-and the interests of such an entity could not
be subordinated to or coordinated with any other "business"
whether within or outside the corporate structure. Corporate
ownership for investment could continue, as the Canadian For-
eign Investment Review Act of 1974 permits it to continue, with
respect to "businesses" subject to that Act, 86 but control by the
executives of a centralized corporate structure would violate the
antitrust laws.
This change in the antitrust laws would create hundreds of
thousands of new opportunities for direct participation, would
stimulate initiative, increase the opportunity to experience the
effects of one's own decisions, and develop self-sufficiency. At
long last, to the extent consistent with retaining the benefits of
industrialization, Learned Hand's proposition, "[i]t is possible,
because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of
small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own
skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those
engaged must accept the direction of a few,"'87 would be im-
plemented. This would make it possible for a great many per-
sons to realize for themselves their liberty, or freedom, by
abating the stifling influence of the "giant companies" on en-
trepreneurial opportunity. Yet reducing concentration is the
immediate, not the ultimate, goal. For only by checking the
power of corporations may one mount a convincing argument
that the power of the giant labor unions and the "bureaucratic
imperialism of government agencies" 88 are in need of constraint
as well. 89
86 Can. Stat. c. 46, §§ 3(6)(c), (d) (1973).
87 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
" Note 79 supra & accompanying text.
89 Many persons concerned with business management might welcome the alterna-
tive proposal contained in this article. The Wharton School of Finance and the business
schools of Harvard and Stanford have begun developing graduate programs for execu-
tives from small businesses, and more business school graduates are discovering the
unique opportunities offered by small businesses. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 15,
1977, § A, at 9, col. 1.
